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A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL
THEORY: LESSONS FROM THE EXTREMITY
James G. Stewart*

Corporate criminal liability is a controversial beast. To a large extent,
the controversies surround three core questions: first, whether there is a
basic conceptual justification for using a system of criminal justice
constructed for individuals against inanimate entities like corporations;
second, what value corporate criminal liability could have given coexistent possibilities of civil redress against them; and third, whether
corporate criminal liability has any added value over and above
individual criminal responsibility of corporate officers. This article uses
examples from the frontiers of international criminal justice to criticize all
sides of these debates. In particular, I highlight the shortcomings of
corporate criminal theory to date by examining the latent possibility of
prosecuting corporate actors for the pillage of natural resources and for
complicity through the supply of weapons. Throughout, the article draws
on principles derived from philosophical and legal pragmatism to reveal a
set of recurring analytical flaws in this literature. These include: a
tendency to presuppose a perfect single jurisdiction that overlooks
globalization, the blind projection of local theories of corporate criminal
responsibility onto global corporate practices; and a perspective that
sometimes seems insensitive to the plight of the many who have fallen
victim to corporate crime in the developing world. To begin anew, we
need to embrace a pragmatic theory of corporate criminal liability that is
forced upon us in a world as complex, unequal, and dysfunctional as that
we presently inhabit.

*

Global Hauser Fellow, NYU Law. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of
British Columbia. My kind thanks to participants at the University of Toronto workshop
on corporate criminal liability, and to Maureen Gillis for outstanding research assistance.
Errors and oversights are mine alone.
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“When the formalist dream of finding invariant meanings
underwritten by God or the structure of rationality is exploded, what
remains is not dust and ashes but the solidity and plasticity of the
world human beings continually make and remake.”
Stanley Fish1

I. INTRODUCTION
The history of corporate criminal liability is pragmatic. In the United
States, the seminal decision authorizing the curious practice of holding
corporations criminally responsible explicitly reasoned that disallowing
the practice “would virtually take away the only means of effectually
controlling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.”2
Corporate criminal liability was, in effect, a practical necessity given the
absence of other viable forms of redress. The rapid uptake of corporate
criminal liability in Europe several decades later was inspired by similar
thinking. In calling European nations to embrace corporate criminal
responsibility despite the anthropomorphism inherent in treating inanimate
entities as having mental states, the Council of Europe argued that
individual criminal liability of corporate officers left an unacceptable
regulatory gap, which corporate criminal responsibility could fill.3 In both
1

Stanley Fish, Truth and Toilets: Pragmatism and the Practices of Life, in THE REVIVAL
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 418, 419
(Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).
2
New York Central R. Co. v. United States., 212 U.S. 481, 496 (1909). See also
Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an
Observation, 60 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY 393, 421–422 (1982).
(concluding that within Anglo-American systems, “recognition of corporate criminal
accountability constituted a more effective response to problems created by corporate
business activities than did existing private remedies.”).
3
In 1988, the Council of Europe recommended that European states rapidly overcome
their earlier misgivings with corporate criminal liability, on the bases of “the increasing
number of criminal offences committed in the exercise of the activities of enterprises
which cause considerable damage to both individuals and the community” and “the
difficulty, rooted in the legal traditions of many European states, of rendering enterprises
which are corporate bodies criminally liable.” See, Council of Europe, Recommendation
no. R (88) 18 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning Liability of
Enterprises Having Legal Personality for Offences Committed in the Exercise of Their
OF
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instances, the justifications for the concept were, first and foremost, highly
pragmatic.
By no small coincidence, these events took place (in the United States
at least) at almost precisely the same time as the advent of philosophical
pragmatism. In 1907, only two years prior to the US Supreme Court’s
landmark decision approving corporate criminal liability, William James
published his celebrated philosophical text, Pragmatism.4 James was a
gentleman. While he accepted credit for the label, he magnanimously
conceded that the underlying theory originated with his friend Charles
Peirce.5 The great philosopher John Dewey continued the burgeoning
pragmatic philosophical tradition,6 before it fell into a long period of
stasis, only to be resurrected by Richard Rorty some thirty years later.7
While there is much variation within the school these philosophers
initiated, they shared a distaste for what they describe as “philosophical
escapism.” For the philosophical pragmatists, the rest of philosophy had
become overly abstract, self-referential, and practically disengaged.
In the past decades, scholars have incorporated aspects of this
philosophical tradition into legal theory, claiming to have developed a
middle way between legal formalism and realism. A number of
distinguished legal theorists have adopted some variant of legal
pragmatism as a methodology,8 but none more prominent than Richard
Posner.9 Initially an academic pioneer of law and economics then an
appellate judge in the United States, Posner’s work on pragmatism sought
to censure the tendency, in his view rife within the legal academy, to offer
theories that amounted to little more than “highfalutin rhetoric of
absolutes.”10 Instead of engaging with these absolute theories, Posner
maintained that his iteration of legal pragmatism was normatively
preferable. For Posner, his approach entailed “a disposition to base action
Activities (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 October 1988 at the 420th
meeting of the Ministers' Deputies).
4
WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM (1995).
5
Charles S. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, 12 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 286
(1878); Charles S. Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, 12 POPULAR SCIENCE 1 (1877).
6
See, in particular, JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (2008).
7
RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1981); For a beautiful
discussion about the relationship between pragmatic philosophy and law, see Richard
Rorty, Pragmatism and Law: A Response to David Luban, in THE REVIVAL OF
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE, supra note 1 at
304.
8
See in particular, JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2003).
9
Posner’s most prominent text on pragmatism is RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2005).
10
POSNER, supra note 9, at 12.
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on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms, generalities,
pieties, and slogans.”11
Strangely, though, legal pragmatism has not been harnessed to
criticize corporate criminal theory, despite this concept’s unquestionable
origins in highly pragmatic thinking and its remarkable coincidence with
the rise of philosophical pragmatism. However, only legal pragmatism can
offer anything approaching an adequate account of corporate criminal
liability in its full complexity, which must account for the following
variables: the application of corporate criminal liability to crimes that vary
from tax evasion to genocide; corporate actors as diverse as gigantic
multinationals enterprises whose revenues exceed those of most states and
closely held family businesses; corporations operating uniquely within the
borders of a single state and those engaged in transactions across the four
corners of an increasingly globalized planet; and companies that are
incorporated for profit as compared with others that pursue charity. What
theory can account for the innumerable contingencies corporate criminal
theory must navigate in these circumstances, other than a pragmatic theory
that resists absolute claims?
Two examples from the frontiers of international criminal justice
substantiate this point. The first involves corporate responsibility for the
war crime of pillage, for illegally exploiting natural resources from
modern conflict zones. Modern national courts not only enjoy jurisdiction
over corporations who perpetrate this war crime,12 they can draw on a rich
body of precedent to articulate the parameters of the offense as applied to
corporations.13 For instance, at the end of the Second World War, a range
of corporate officers from German businesses were prosecuted for
pillaging natural resources like coal, iron and oil,14 all of which were
exploited to fuel the Nazi apparatus. But since then, legally comparable
commercial practices have led to little real accountability, despite the fact
that illegal exploitation of natural resources from conflict zones has
substituted for superpower sponsorship as a predominant means of
11

Id. at 3.
For an overview of the law likely to govern corporate responsibility for pillaging
natural resources from conflict zones, including the bases upon which many national
courts can prosecute corporations for international crimes like pillage, see JAMES G.
STEWART, CORPORATE WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING PILLAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES
(2010).
13
Id.
14
Id. Walther Funk has convicted of pillage achieved through his role in the management
of a commercial enterprise named the Continental Oil Company, which exploited crude
oil throughout occupied Europe; Paul Pleiger, the manager of a company known by the
acronym BHO, guilty of pillaging coal from mines located in Poland; convicting
businessman Hermann Roechling for pillage after he seized and exploited steel plants at
Moselle and Meurthe-et-Moselle that yielded 9 million tons of liquid steel per annum.
12
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conflict financing since the end of the Cold War.15 Coupling corporate
criminal liability, the war crime of pillage and the jurisdiction of domestic
courts over these crimes offers a new means of ending this impunity,
which is very much in keeping with the pragmatic origins of corporate
criminal liability as a concept.
The second illustration looks to the arms industry. Advocates suggest
that over 2,000 civilians die each week from weapons-related injuries,
many at the hands of notoriously brutal regimes that acquired this
weaponry from corporations.16 I argue that under certain circumstances,
corporations that manufacturer, sell and distribute weaponry become
complicit in the international crimes their commerce enables.17 To draw
again on illustrations from practice, corporate officers were prosecuted for
selling the chemicals used to asphyxiate civilians at Auschwitz after
WWII,18 and modern courts have also begun to prosecute individual arms
vendors for complicity in international crimes for knowingly transferring
weapons to recipients who use them to perpetrate atrocities.19 While these
precedents are presently focused on corporate officers as individuals, a
turn to corporations is imminent. In good pragmatic tradition, this shift is
likely to appeal given the paucity of other viable avenues for redress.
What then are the key tenets of legal pragmatism, and how do these
examples from the forefront of international criminal justice help
15

PHILIPPE LE BILLON, WARS OF PLUNDER: CONFLICTS, PROFITS AND THE POLITICS OF
RESOURCES (2012); NATURAL RESOURCES AND VIOLENT CONFLICT: OPTIONS AND
ACTIONS, (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., 2003); MICHAEL KLARE, RESOURCE WARS:
THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT (2002).
16
ANDREW FEINSTEIN, THE SHADOW WORLD: INSIDE THE GLOBAL ARMS TRADE (2011);
LORA LUMPE, RUNNING GUNS: THE GLOBAL BLACK MARKET IN SMALL ARMS (2000);
RACHEL STOHL & SUZETTE GRILLOT, THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE (2009).
17
I concede that this point is not beyond dispute as a matter of criminal theory. See R A
Duff, “Can I Help You?” Accessorial Liability and the Intention to Assist, 10 LEGAL
STUDIES 165 (1990) (arguing that using complicity in the ordinary course of business is
structurally akin to omission liability since it requires the businessperson to break with
their usual course of conduct). For different views that use arms vendors as examples of
accessorial liability, see John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. LAW AND
PHILOS. 127 (2007); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A
COLLECTIVE AGE (2000).
18
Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), British Military Court,
Hamburg, 1 Law Report of Trials of War Criminals, 93 (March 8, 1946).
19
Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, Netherlands, LJN: BA6734, Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage ,
2200050906-2, (May 9, 2007) (charging Frans Van Anraat with complicity in genocide
and war crimes for selling chemical weapons to Saddam Hussein, that were ultimately
used to gas civilians); Prosecutor v. Kouwenhoven, Netherlands, LJN: AY5160,
Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage , 09/750001-05 (July 28, 2006) (charging Guus Kouwenhoven
with complicity in international crimes perpetrated by Charles Taylor’s regime in
Liberia).
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demonstrate its necessity in corporate criminal theory? To begin, note that
there is little agreement among self-styled pragmatists about the content of
their method, which requires that I pick and choose certain themes to
inform this critique.20 In so doing, I neither concur with the controversial
conclusions some pragmatisms reach,21 nor defend pragmatism against its
many detractors.22 Instead, I use five central themes distilled from
philosophical and legal pragmatism in order to highlight significant
structural flaws in thinking about corporate crime. In many respects,
examples from international criminal justice suit these purposes ideally;
their extreme nature allows us to test the integrity of categorical models
from the periphery rather than the core, and the highly transnational
character of the underlying transactions upsets the state-centric thinking
that animates many existing accounts of corporate criminal liability. Let
me proceed, then, to introduce the five pragmatic themes.
First, pragmatism rejects abstract theories that are absolute in
formulation. In its philosophical guise, this arises from an antifoundationalist view of epistemology, which denies that there are
fundamental and indubitable truths. As John Dewey explains, when a
theory is “[n]ot tested by being employed to see what it leads to in
ordinary experience and what new meanings it contributes, this subjectmatter becomes arbitrary, aloof—what is called ‘abstract’ when that word
is used in a bad sense to designate something which exclusively occupies
a realm of its own without contact with the things of ordinary
experience.”23 Once incorporated into legal theory, this idea clashes with
formalism—the notion that abstract concepts rationally applied
mechanically produce specific answers in concrete cases.24 By contrast,
pragmatists distrust “pretensions of totalizing Big Think theories to

20

To some extent, many scholars consider that legal pragmatism can stand apart from its
predecessor philosophical pragmatism, but I choose to draw from both traditions.
Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM:
NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at 254.
21
I am opposed, for instance, to Posner’s reasoning about the role of pragmatism in the
war on terror. See POSNER, supra note 9.
22
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 150–153 (1986); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC
SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 26–57 (1999);
David Luban, What’s Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism?, in THE REVIVAL OF
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE, supra note 1.
23
DEWEY, supra note 6, at 6.
24
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL
THEORY OF LAW 35 (1999) (discussing formalism within the context of pragmatism more
broadly).
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capture all that is important in law.”25 And yet, as we will soon see,
existing theories of corporate criminal liability are almost invariably
couched in absolutist terms, in ways pragmatism is so keen to expose as
either fallacious or meaningless.
Second, pragmatism evaluates the merit of a theory in purely
instrumental terms. In the earliest stages of this critical philosophy,
William James famously announced that pragmatism “has no particular
results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method.”26 The
quintessence of the method he imagined was to dispassionately ascertain
whether a given theory was “good for anything.”27 To return to Dewey,
the acid test of any philosophical concept is: “[d]oes it end in conclusions
which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their
predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and
make our dealings with them more fruitful.”28 Alas, I fear that the answer
to this question for much of current corporate criminal theory is no, and
that cases at the brink of international criminal justice help expose this
reality most clearly.
Third, pragmatists undertake their assessment of theories with great
sensitivity to context. In keeping with the understanding that truth is
dynamic, not eternal, many pragmatists look to realities within particular
historical and cultural contexts to gauge the merit of conceptual models.29
In the legal realm, Thomas Grey eloquently argues that “[p]ragmatists
remind lawyers that their activities are complex and multifarious, and
unlikely to be completely accounted for by any single theory, however
compelling its application in any particular context.”30 Despite this
warning, much of the literature offering theoretical accounts of corporate
criminal liability is universal in conception but informed by only a single
context. Corporate responsibility for tax fraud in Delaware need not hold
to the same conceptual principles as corporate war crimes in Iraq, the
Congo or East Timor, but theorists often gloss over these nuances,
offering accounts that presume one-size-fits-all.

25

David Luban, What’s Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism?, in THE REVIVAL OF
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at
275.
26
JAMES, supra note 4, at 47.
27
Grey, supra note 20, at 265. (Pragmatists ask, in assessing theories, what good they are
for anything").
28
DEWEY, supra note 6, at 9–10.
29
POSNER, supra note 9, at 52. (“pragmatists justify their recommendations contextually.
They see the quest for livable ethical principles as arising from concrete practices and
predicaments, situated in particular historical and cultural contexts.”)
30
Grey, supra note 20, at 266.
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Beneath this commitment to assessing theories in context lies an
associated concern about perspective. Because truth is contingent rather
than universal, the perspective of those offering theoretical explanations
colors the validity of their conceptual models. In addressing this point,
Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman emphasize “how apparently neutral
and universal rules in effect burden or exclude anyone who does not share
the characteristics of privileged, white, Christian, able-bodied,
heterosexual, adult men for whom those rules were actually written.”31
Even if some of these biases are less obvious in the context of corporate
criminal theory, many commentators do assume a single perfect
jurisdiction, which plays down widespread corporate crimes in the Global
South, and in the case of international crimes in particular, their terrible
continuity with colonialism and slavery. Asking how to best achieve
justice for corporate crimes in these contexts inserts a new perspective that
immediately disrupts the discourse.
Fourth, and relatedly, pragmatisms are weary of universalizing local
experience. In a world where truth is malleable and dynamic, conceptual
principles that are valid within one community are not immediately
transposable across all manifestations of the phenomena. As Dewey puts
it, we should resist the temptation to “transform purely immediate
qualities of local things into generic relationships.”32 This proposition
perhaps warrants no real emphasis in an age that has finally begun to
embrace legal pluralism, and yet in some instances, corporate criminal
theory still contravenes this principle by adopting a parochial
understanding of the concept even though others exist elsewhere and by
overlooking that many corporations are operating in contexts that are not
local, i.e., in countries foreign to theorists. At points, this tendency in
corporate criminal theory is so pronounced that it risks substantiating
Richard Posner’s concern that “[o]ur minds race ahead of themselves…
inclining us to universalize our local, limited insights.”33
Fifth, pragmatism is committed to experimentation. As a philosophical
principle, pragmatism “is eclectic, a thing of compromises, that seeks a
modus vivendi above all things.”34 This implies a desire for rigorous
conceptual explanations, but ones that are consistent with practice rather
than pure abstractions in the sense pejorative to pragmatisms. So, contrary
to Posner’s appreciation of the concept, pragmatism does not eschew
moral theorizing or its relevance to law; it recommends instead that each
31

Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1601
(1989).
32
DEWEY, supra note 6, at 128–129.
33
POSNER, supra note 9, at 5.
34
JAMES, supra note 4, at 25.
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and every conceptual ideal is tested in the laboratory of real-world
experience.35 On a superficial level, all of our attempts to regulate the
might of corporate power follow this model, from the advent of corporate
criminal liability to the Alien Tort Claims Act and beyond. The challenge
is for theoretical understandings to catch up with these ongoing acts of
experimentation, which will soon move into a new international phase. In
a world as complex and dysfunctional as that we inhabit, experimentation
like this is a necessity.
Finally, let me qualify the foregoing and situate these principles within
criticisms of pragmatism. On the one hand, I remain agnostic about
pragmatism as an interpretative technique, and I certainly see enormous
value in an ongoing engagement between philosophy and law. I am also
almost entirely on board with Henry Smith’s thoughtful argument that
“[l]egal pragmatism is best understood as a kind of exhortation about
theorizing; its function is not to say things that lawyers and judges do not
know, but rather to remind lawyers and judges of what they already
believe but often fail to practice.”36 While most of the key tenets of
pragmatism are just basic measures of any defensible theory, there is still
something unique to the pragmatic method in an area such as corporate
criminal theory, where the contingencies are immense and cannot be
known ahead of time. In essence, at least here, pragmatism has unique
value. Thus, we should embrace a pragmatic theory of corporate criminal
liability that circumstance forces upon us.
My argument elaborating on these views proceeds in three phases.
Having set out basic themes of legal pragmatism that I use as benchmarks
throughout the remainder of this article, Part II addresses both sides of the
arguments for and against corporate criminal liability as a concept. Those
who argue that we need corporate criminal liability may be correct as a
generic policy, but their arguments cannot be universalized for every
iteration of corporate offending. Likewise, attempts to account for the
guilt of corporations in retributive terms are, sometimes by their own
admission, contingent in ways that often pass unnoticed. Part III then
employs the same methodology to criticize debates about the relative
merit of corporate criminal liability as compared with corporate civil
liability. Here, we witness violations of all principles pragmatists revere:
local experience universalized without regard to context, perspective or
heterogeneity in the real world. Part IV continues the pragmatic critique
by highlighting how many of the arguments for corporate criminal liability
over and above individual liability of corporate officers do not
35

Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner
and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687, 708 (2003).
36
Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 411 (1990).
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automatically apply to international crimes. I conclude by arguing that in
order to make sense of all this, we require a entirely new pragmatic model
that grapples with the many hidden variables, appreciates the vast array of
applicable laws as best possible, and develops conceptual priorities that
operate on a provisional not fixed basis.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Corporate criminal liability is a controversial creature. To essentialize
the competing arguments, the debate is between those who argue we need
corporate criminal liability and others who complain that it jeopardizes the
criminal law’s exclusively individualistic focus, thereby endangering the
discipline and society. Indeed, when puzzling over the curious practice of
blaming inanimate entities, many doubt “the justice and wisdom of
imposing a stigma of moral blame in the absence of blameworthiness in
the actor.”37 In this section, I criticize both sides of this debate, arguing
that much of this discourse has fallen into the unconvincing habit of overgeneralization, in ways that contravene almost all of the tenets pragmatists
hold dear. Once we correct for these structural flaws, as the advent of
corporate responsibility for international crimes will demand, we begin to
observe the highly contingent character of arguments for and against
corporate criminal liability. This, in turn, should lead inexorably to the
triumph of a pragmatic, not absolute, explanation of the concept.
A.

The Occasionally Overstated Need for Corporate Criminal Liability

If one were to reduce consequentialist accounts of corporate
criminal liability to a slogan, it might be this: one legal fiction deserves
another. The decision to grant corporations personhood was the original
conceptual evil, so having endorsed this initial untruth, we should at least
follow the fiction through to its logical conclusion. Otherwise, if we
tolerate the half measure, corporations are assigned all the normal human
propensity for causing harm, but no possibility of being called to account
before one of society’s strongest means of expressing moral
condemnation. Put differently, to entertain the magical thinking that
corporations are people to the tremendous benefit of these entities, then to
slam the door on arguments that they should be held responsible like
37

Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing
Economic Regulations, 30 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 422, 422 (1963).
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people seems badly lop-sided. In the name of consistency, we need
corporate criminal liability to balance the conceptual scales; we need a
second lie to counterbalance the first.
But on closer inspection, the idea of pursuing the fallacy to its
logical ends invites dangerous floodgates arguments in two directions. In
the first, does this commitment mean that we could also have a
corporation as President of the United States? In the second, would the
theory of moral agency this would entail also mean that states, rebel
groups, international organizations and the Holy See could be held
criminally responsible? If not, why? Without clear philosophical
parameters preventing this multi-directional slippage, the argument for
complete embrace of corporate personality seems too absolute, in ways
pragmatists rightly reject. Legislatures and courts do not adopt corporate
criminal liability because of its philosophical coherence within the
surrounding legal system, they do so out of a very pragmatic concern that
there is no other meaningful option.
It is not difficult to sympathize with the anxiety that feeds this
posture—evidence of corporate power makes for staggering reading. Of
the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations,38 and the
revenues of just General Motors and Ford “exceed the combined GDP for
all of sub-Saharan Africa.”39 To draw on one sector that is especially
relevant to our present inquiry, the top 100 companies involved in the
production and marketing of arms and ammunition reportedly posted a
60% increase in profit between the years 2000 and 2004 alone. And yet
already, the intuition that corporate might necessitates corporate criminal
liability reveals an argument whose boundaries are ill-defined and a onesize-fits-all approach that need not coincide with every instance of
corporate criminality. True, many international crimes are occasioned by
the actions of these leviathans, but some are also carried out by their
miniscule siblings.
The extractive industry, for instance, habitually relies on much
smaller risk-embracing “juniors” to operate in conflict zones in order to
acquire cheaper access to precious metals such as coltan, cassiterite, gold
and wolframite. These “juniors” tend to be closely held companies, some
of which are just shells specifically created for single high-risk
commercial speculation carried out by individual businesspeople. In
certain circumstances, there is evidence to suggest that some of these
companies have been instrumental in determining the course of major
international armed conflicts, installing new governments by signing
lucrative extractive contracts with rebel groups en pleine guerre. And yet,
38

SARAH ANDERSON, TOP 200: THE RISE OF CORPORATE GLOBAL POWER 1 (2008).
JOSHUA KARLINER, THE CORPORATE PLANET 5 (1997).

39
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if any of these companies are ever criminally prosecuted, the size and
strength of multinational corporations globally will provide no
justification for the practice.
Perhaps deterrence is the better rationale? Indeed, many argue that
corporations may be more rational than individuals, thus allowing the
criminal law to better stymie future offending. As Brent Fisse has cogently
argued, the reality with criminal law in its individualistic orientation is
that society expresses condemnation in a way that ostracizes the people
who perpetrate crimes, exacerbating rather than correcting the social
deviance that led to the offending.40 By contrast, “corporations are more
likely to react positively to criminal stigma by attempting to repair their
images and regain public confidence.”41 Despite the inherent difficulty of
measuring deterrence, there is stimulating literature that suggests
corporations may be more deterrable than individuals in certain
circumstances.42 If this is true, corporate criminal liability offers very new
opportunities for deterring crime,43 which tends to remain underappreciated in the literature on deterrence of atrocity, which is almost
exclusively oriented towards individuals alone.
Let me expand. To date, much of the literature on deterrence of
atrocity has focused uniquely on the social foment necessary to generate
mass violence, pointing out that any rational incentive generated by
criminal law is unlikely to restrain the fierce passion required to perpetrate
offences of this barbarity, particularly when the probability of prosecution
is so low.44 And yet, this assumes that only individuals are guilty of
international crimes. On the contrary, corporations pursuing profit rather
40

Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault,
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than inter-ethnic rivalries also satisfy the formal elements of international
crimes. And importantly, the corporations that sustain bloodshed are more
exposed to foreign law enforcement, more prone to rational deliberation
through their commitment to profit-maximization, and likely to perceive
conviction for a war crime as nothing short of a commercial catastrophe.
Thus, there is reason for some jubilation at this promising new stratagem
for inhibiting mass violence, even if it remains latent at present.
To placate the pragmatists, though, we should still qualify our
enthusiasm. For one reason, some companies are very much part and
parcel of a genocidal apparatus, undermining the arguments that
corporations are more prone to general or specific deterrence than those
who fiercely swing the machetes. During WWII, the Nazi regime created
all range of companies to implement their terrifying expansionist
agenda,45 but a more modern example better illustrates the point. During
the Rwandan genocide, calls to butchery were constantly issued and coordinated by the infamous Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLM).46 These acts constitute corporate crime par excellence, even if
they were never tried as such. Only here, the corporate officers were every
bit as “impassioned” as those who obediently responded to their
instigations. Consequently, deterrence may well be illusory here, for
reasons many excellent scholars of international criminal justice point
out.47 The overarching point, which coincides perfectly with core concepts
in pragmatism, is that reality is far more complex than any one absolute
conceptual model can explain.
Enter law and economics, where the habit of over-generalizing plays
out in different garb. While corporate criminal responsibility has inspired
excellent scholarship in law and economics, much of it fails adequately to
tailor pure theory to the realities of globalized markets. As Jennifer Arlen
explains, the tendency among commentators is to “present the classic
economic analysis of corporate liability for crime, focusing on optimal
individual and corporate liability in a ‘perfect world’48 But what of the
45
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deeply flawed one we populate? Jennifer Arlen’s work is very good at
offering altered iterations based on real-world contingencies, but this
approach must be extended still further, such that a pragmatic attitude
becomes the norm rather than the exception. If we view the problem of
corporate offending as a global phenomenon and purge ourselves of our
understandable proclivity to view law through a very “local” lens, leading
economic theory suddenly fails to explain many iterations of the subject in
its extremity.
Take the gravity of international crimes like genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. If the utility of criminal law is at least
partially dependent upon the social meaning of a crime’s stigma,49 it
stands to reason that the utility of corporate criminal responsibility is not
constant across different crimes. The extreme character of international
offenses is helpful in exposing the point: corporations will probably react
differently to being convicted of a war crime than an everyday domestic
offense. In fact, popular associations with international crimes might be so
intense that companies are over-deterred from operating in volatile
political climates, creating a counterproductive economic trap for nationstates struggling to avoid or emerge from episodes of mass violence. And
yet, these intricacies do not feature in the justifications for corporate
criminal liability on offer within law and economics,50 which sometimes
seem to assume transactions within a single pristine legal system. By
definition, corporate crimes in war zones fall outside this model.
Maybe stigmatizing companies is the better rationale for corporate
criminal liability? The argument goes that “[t]he stigma and sanctions of
the criminal law promise greater deterrence from corporate misconduct
and more opportunities for asset recovery, compensation, and mandatory
corporate reform.”51 In addition, many also speak to the role of criminal
justice in propagating moral values within a post-modern world that has
seen the decline of alternative moral systems.52 To bring things back to
international criminal justice, prosecuting corporations involved in the
49
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sale of weapons or the pillage of natural resources from war zones can
transmit values across a global market in a singly unique manner. Given
the ubiquity of these corporate crimes and the market’s spectacular
success in insulating itself from the sharp end of all other forms of
accountability, might corporate convictions for international crimes not
harness stigma to good effect?
Sometimes, however, corporate criminal liability may be too blunt
an instrument. An alternative strategy geared towards acculturation rather
than stigmatization may prove more successful in changing endemic
commercial practices, depending on the prevailing circumstances. In the
sister field of international human rights, Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks
have pointed to the potential superiority of strategies that employ
acculturation to promote compliance, beyond those that are coercive or
persuasive in character.53 So, if acculturation is likely to be more effective
as a tool for restraining corporate excess in any given situation, sharper
punishments could actually run counter to the expressive purpose many
view as a key justification for corporate criminal liability.54 We should,
therefore, recoil from the proposition that corporate criminal liability is
always preferrable or even useful as a communicative device, in favour of
a theory that responds to realities on the ground in a more dynamic
fashion. That theory is pragmatic.
B.

The Contingencies of Corporate Desert

In the preceding section, we considered a small set of
consequentialist arguments for corporate criminal liability. The classic
response is simple—they leave out guilt. In his famous reconciliation of
the general theoretical purpose of criminal law as a system as a whole and
the principles to be employed in attributing blame in concrete cases, HLA
Hart pointed out that even if your rationale for punishment within a
criminal system generally is deterrence, it is clearly morally vulgar to
punish family members of those who carried out criminal offenses, even if
doing so has massive deterrent effects.55 By analogy, the use of criminal
law as mechanism of regulatory control over corporations in the sale of
weapons to warring African countries, say, is only defensible if the
corporation is first culpable of some established crime. And here, many
53
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argue, corporate criminal liability fails to comply with first principles of
criminal responsibility.
Consider some of the effects of shoehorning corporations into a
criminal structure built for individuals: a corporation has no mind and
therefore cannot experience guilt; it has no body so cannot therefore act in
a sense that is not entirely derivative; punishing it would violate the
fundamental principle that punishment must be imposed only on the actual
offender; and the usual penalties envisaged within the criminal law are
frustrated where the nature of the convicted party precludes
incarceration.56 For many commentators, forcing a square peg into a round
hole like this is not only unfair to the corporation called to answer within a
criminal trial, it does violence to the discipline that is obliged to
accommodate the poor fit. If we are interested to construct a coherent,
holistic account of criminal justice, instead of treating corporations as a
category apart, these concerns are worrisome. 57 Might it be, then, that the
discussions about the utility of corporate criminal liability miss this
broader picture, and the foundations upon which criminal justice rests?
Many would say no. Indeed, there is much excellent work refuting
each of these propositions, but in some instances it too overstates the
generality of a principle that may not obtain in concrete circumstances.
Corporate guilt is a case in point. At one level, the fact that we frequently
blame corporations is a popular rejoinder to those who argue that
corporations cannot be guilty. As Samuel Buell argues, we hold BP
responsible for massive damage caused by a faulty oil drill in the Gulf of
Mexico, or experience moral shock that a weapons manufacturer would
sell weapons to Hutu extremists at the zenith of the Rwanda Genocide,
which demonstrates that corporations also populate our moral universe.
He opines that, “[i]t is a fact of contemporary life that our conception of
responsibility includes beliefs about institutional responsibility.”58 These
sorts of practice-oriented explanations for moral agency elevate
corporations to a position alongside individuals as deserving of criminal
blame based on common moral intuitions.
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Of course, intuitions might be valuable in developing stereotypes,
but they are often wrong in specific contexts. So instead of crafting
corporate criminal liability from common public sentiment, we are
compelled to imagine an ontological basis for liability that reflects the
corporation’s own blameworthiness. Christian List and Philip Pettit offer a
profound justification for blaming corporations along these lines,59 and for
once, it comes replete with a range of qualifications that, perhaps
unbeknownst to its authors, render the account somewhat pragmatic. They
start by identifying conditions for agency, which include: the ability to
make a normatively significant choice; judgmental capacity, in the sense
of understanding what is at stake and having the ability to access
evidence; and relevant control to choose between the options.60 Having
posited these as necessary and sufficient conditions for agent
responsibility, they hold that many group agents such as corporations can
satisfy these requirements,61 but they also carve out circumstances where
these standards are not met.62 All this means that the best conceptual
justifications are sensitive to the type of corporation on trial, as
pragmatism would implore.
Having established that some corporations can be blamed, a number
of difficult practical questions arise. Where, for instance, do we look to
prove a corporation’s culpability? For Pamela Bucy, corporate culpability
is to be located in a “corporate ethos,” which is identified through
inspecting the role of the board in monitoring compliance, corporate goals,
emphasis on educating employees about legal requirements, compensation
incentives and the like.63 Models of this sort seek to capture “genuine
corporate culpability,”64 instead of depending on the double-derivative
character of corporate liability in complicity cases (where an employee is
derivatively liable for use of weapons by an African warlord, and the
company becomes derivatively liable through the employee).65 The
corporation is an entity capable of deserving punishment in its own right,
quite apart from the actions of its individual representatives. To find the
59
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corporate culture that is the blameworthy source of responsibility, we
simply look to corporate practices that reflect the organization’s identity.
Admittedly, this idea of corporate culture is hotly contested, but the
pragmatist acknowledges the circumstances where the proposition is true.
For John Braithwaite and Brent Fisse, for instance, we should not dwell on
our inability to see corporate culture in physical form—both individuals
and corporations are an amalgam of observable and abstract
characteristics.66 Moreover, corporations and their representatives are not
one and the same; they have symbiotic relations to one another. The Navy
is constituted by the actions of individual sailors, but so too the existence
of the sailor is constituted by the existence of the Navy.67 Thus,
corporations have their own separate ontology, which cannot be reduced
to individual agency without turning a blind eye to the formative influence
of the overarching organization and the unique role this can play in
bringing about harm.
Once again, however, one wonders whether this thesis can hold true
across all corporations. A behemoth bureaucracy like the Navy, for
example, that deliberately attempts to shape individual behavior of
members, is not necessarily the same as the relatively minute corporate
structures that instigate the pillage of natural resources in modern conflict
zones. Earlier, we discussed the use of “juniors” in the illegal exploitation
of conflict minerals, precisely because they are closely held shells that are
easily discarded to avoid detection. It is not clear to what extent there is
any real symbiosis between individual and corporation within these
entities, whether “juniors” have any identifiable culture, or where we are
to draw the line in isolating these phenomena as companies increase in
size and sophistication. Braithwaite and Fisse’s otherwise outstanding
explanation only speaks to a certain type of corporate reality, and
therefore offers a justification that is dependent on contingencies that only
pragmatism can accommodate.
The next set of arguments suffers from similar deficiencies. What of
the retort that corporate criminal liability punishes innocent individuals,
which forms a key part of the conceptual backlash against corporate
criminal liability? A significant portion of the literature regrets the
66
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“reputational rub-off” effect of corporate criminal liability on senior
managers,68 and more frequently, the fact that the costs of a corporate
conviction tend to be borne by employees and shareholders who are
presumptively innocent. If Arthur Andersen’s conviction for obstructing
justice in the Enron fiasco ultimately cost 80,000 people their jobs,69
would convicting a major diamond producer for pillaging blood diamonds
from warring African states not amount to an instantaneous corporate
death sentence, which would ultimately punish innocent company
affiliates indiscriminately and in great disproportion to the atrocities the
company had enabled?
Already, adding atrocities to this hypothetical changes the terms of
the usual debate, showing the weakness of these arguments as a ground
for abolishing corporate criminal liability across the board. Sometimes,
the harm averted clearly outweighs that incidentally visited upon
shareholders and employees, but surely not always. In any event, the
double standards that lurk just beneath the surface are difficult to swallow.
The sudden concern for indirect victims of corporate criminal liability sits
uncomfortably with the almost total lack of empathy for the plight of
family, children and community members when a person is invited to
serve time. On a broader level, capitalism postulates that the brutality of
forcing 80,000 people onto the streets to find new work is justifiable—
nay, desirable—when market forces dictate that their employer is no
longer economically competitive, but the same effects that flow from
market reactions to their employer’s moral turpitude are denounced as an
aberration.
But we need not decide the issue definitively in the abstract. It may
be that in weighing the strengths and weaknesses of a corporate
prosecution, the perceived benefit of proceeding against a corporation is
superseded by the immediate negative ramifications to individuals. While
the slogan “too big to fail” is politically distasteful, it should alert us to the
fact that the incidental implications of corporate failure are not constant
across all corporations or contained within national borders. By attempting
to find categorical positions on issues that simultaneously address the
family carpet company in India and Goldman Sachs on Wall Street, we
risk advocating for absolute standards that have potentially tremendous
ramifications when applied without sensitivity to context. Without
excusing big banks, it is possible to offer a pragmatic middle ground that
68
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moves beyond black-and-white arguments whose rigidity will prove harsh
if applied blindly in all conceivable scenarios.
III. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY VERSUS CORPORATE CIVIL
LIABILITY
The second set of arguments that influence the identity of corporate
criminal liability relates to the relationship between corporate criminal
liability and civil remedies. Might corporate criminal liability be specious
given the availability of civil redress, which explicitly attaches to the
corporation without upsetting basic premises in the criminal law? While
this section deals with a range of arguments for and against this
proposition, it bears recalling at the outset that the common law model of
corporate criminal liability developed because it provided “a more
effective response to problems created by corporate business activities
than did existing private remedies.”70 The same pragmatic rationale will
likely necessitate corporate criminal responsibility for international
crimes, although much depends on the specificities of individual cases. In
many instances, both sides of the debate overlook this nuance.
A.

Qualifying the Categorical Preferences for Civil Liability

Let us begin with the argument, already troubling to the
pragmatist, that civil claims are per se superior to corporate criminal
liability. According to Vikramaditya Khanna, civil liability can better
capture the desirable effects of corporate criminal liability, without
emulating several sub-optimal downsides. Surveying the history of
corporate criminal responsibility within the United States, Khanna opines
that the criminal angle appeared to be “the only available option”71 that
met the need for public enforcement and corporate liability at the time of
its development, given the absence of widespread public civil enforcement
prior to the turn of the 20th century.72 Thus, Khanna and I agree that the
70
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concept developed pragmatically to fill a perceived regulatory gap. We
disagree, however, that the gap is now filled; if one accepts that
corporations are operating transnationally, including in regulatory
vacuums created by war and social turmoil, corporate criminal liability is
still “the only available option” in many instances.
Professor Khanna offers other arguments that also seem too
sweeping in breadth. For instance, he argues that reputational loss is not
effective against certain corporations, since activities that harm third
parties, such as environmental pollution, do not directly affect a firm’s
customers.73 Here again, Khanna’s reasoning is not adequately calibrated
to the moral magnitude of certain systems of criminal law and the
historical associations that, for better or worse, accompany them. Take the
diamond industry. The tremendous success of the media campaign against
furs that brought that industry to its knees more or less directly led to the
Kimberley Process for monitoring conflict diamonds. Perhaps convicting
a major diamond producer of war crimes last visited upon businessmen
who sustained the Nazi apparatus could stimulate a comparable moral
avalanche, even though the harm at issue is to African civilians in survival
economies, not to consumers.
Thus the extremity of international justice helps reveal a hidden
truth that cautions against rigid, categorical, or universal preferences of
this sort. It may well be true that civil liability is preferable in a whole raft
of instances, including for reasons Khanna so ably elucidates, but the need
for qualification is unavoidable. In this instance, the sheer heterogeneity of
crimes for which corporations might be held responsible, which range
from possession of marijuana to insider trading and genocide, militates
against conceptual positions that are so definitive.74 The moral weight
that attaches to each is, quite simply, not constant.75 Therefore, whether
consumers react in ways that promote accountability and responsibility
will depend on the moral gravity of the crime, historical associations with
its perpetration, the surrounding political climate and a host of other
variables, all of which resist processing in the abstract for every
conceivable manifestation of the problem. Consequently, pragmatism
must do much more of the heavy lifting.
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Later, Khanna prefers civil liability because cash fines are optimal
as long as the corporation is not judgment-proof.76 Given the viability of
cash claims against the corporation, he concludes that corporate criminal
liability only detracts from the greater efficacy of civil sanctions.77 But
there is one problem with this explanation, which cases from the frontiers
of international criminal justice again help unveil. Judgment-proof
corporations are likely a relatively finite class within a single functional
North American legal system, where access to justice is comparatively
trouble-free, but this cannot be said for victims of transnational corporate
crimes from the Global South, who are likely to have little to no access to
the civil liability mechanisms we take for granted. A Syrian father of a
child killed in a rocket attack cannot easily sue Russian arms vendors for
contentedly furnishing the perpetrators with weapons used for the atrocity.
So once the single perfect jurisdiction fallacy is withdrawn, it leaves a
sense that the exception is actually the norm.
The essential point, though, is that criminal liability might
occasionally fill accountability gaps like this where civil liability falls
short. To draw a vague parallel, US prosecutors recently indicted the
British weapons giant BAE Systems for violating the US Arms Export
Control Act and making false statements concerning its compliance with
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act78 when the company’s tremendous
political power in Britain effectively rendered it judgment-proof there for
allegedly paying billion-dollar kick-backs to the Saudi government over a
lucrative weapons deal.79 The parallel with complicity and the Syrian
hypothetical is loose but meaningful—criminal and civil liability may
overlap to some extent, but any congruence is far from perfect, and the
portion of the set outside the intersection creates opportunities for
prosecutors that have no equivalent elsewhere. As a result, prosecutors
may find themselves jumping through hoops that are more numerous and
demanding in order to make cases in corporate criminal liability, even
though alternative strategies might be preferable if the case were a
uniquely domestic affair.
Issues of procedure can have a similar effect. In what he describes
as “a pragmatic reassessment” of corporate criminal responsibility,80 John
Coffee references two salient examples of procedural factors that might
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favor criminal rather than civil liability. The first involves the relative
celerity of the criminal trial compared to civil litigation: “because criminal
cases are typically concluded in a much shorter timespan than civil cases,
the criminal law potentially can serve as an engine by which to expedite
restitution to victims.”81 In the context of corporate responsibility for
international crimes, this could be very attractive, even determinative. One
of the only successful civil cases brought against corporations under the
aegis of the Alien Tort Claims Act took 14 years in the pre-trial phase
alone before Shell gallantly fell on its own sword over allegations of
complicity in Nigeria.82 If justice delayed is justice denied, this delay may
constitute a basis for prioritizing criminal cases over other civil
alternatives, even if this choice comes with greater epistemic burdens for
litigants.
Moreover, the criminal angle is attractive since the state brings
charges and absorbs associated costs. Needless to say, this might override
all other conceptual preferences, providing further incentives to pursue
corporate criminal liability over routes that may well be absolutely
optimal within the single perfect jurisdiction.83 Take a seemingly banal
comparative issue like the availability of contingency fees: the idea that
attorneys can take cases in exchange for a percentage of any eventual
award resulting from litigation they undertake on a client’s behalf. In the
United States, these arrangements are by and large condoned, but “[t]he
situation outside the United States is different in virtually every regard.”84
The vast majority of foreign jurisdictions prohibit contingency fees
categorically.85 But saddled with the burden of paying their own way in
private suits against powerful corporations in first-world jurisdictions (not
to mention the risk of having to pay the other side’s costs), victims of
transnational corporate malfeasance may rightly see corporate criminal
liability instigated at a foreign state’s behest as their only hope.
Finally, criminal cases may offer real substantive advantages too.
In the types of scenarios where corporations participate in international
crimes, processing these incidents as civil cases would require plaintiffs to
engage in lengthy litigation dealing with jurisdiction, forum non
81
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conveniens, choice of law and, potentially, enforcement of foreign
judgments. Each of these components erects potential barriers that can and
do prove insurmountable for would-be litigants of transnational corporate
crimes. By contrast, extraterritorial jurisdiction exists over international
crimes most everywhere, allowing prosecutors to bypass these
impediments in private international law through a more streamlined
criminal framing. This resort to extraterritorial application of criminal law
is certainly no panacea,86 but it does second-guess categorical preferences
for civil liability in a world where access to justice is so acutely underdeveloped, to the obvious benefit of corporations.
B.

Over-Generalizing the Utility of Corporate Criminal Liability

The single perfect jurisdiction fallacy also appears on the opposite
side of the equation. Unlike the abolitionists who view corporate criminal
responsibility as an unjustifiable mistake that only obscures civil
remedies,87 the advocates for corporate criminal liability argue for the coexistence of corporate and civil remedies. This difference in
argumentative strategy affects the discourse in important ways; while
critics of corporate criminal responsibility are content to call for its
abolition, advocates who feel they have justified using criminal law to
blame corporations then shift focus to articulate the terms of the
relationship between the two limbs of accountability they view as acting
in concert. Part I addressed certain core philosophical arguments, leaving
us to consider the arguments for corporate criminal liability relative to the
private alternative. The difficulty is that advocates are also often seduced
by the single perfect jurisdiction fallacy and their adversaries’ tendency to
over-generalize.
To begin, note the view that one of corporate criminal liability’s real
competitive advantages over civil alternatives is the criminal law’s ability
to transform commercial practices across an entire industry. These
commercial practices are ubiquitous, requiring the expressive power of
criminal denunciation. For Brandon Garrett, for instance, “[t]aking strong
action against a single firm can also impact an industry to the extent that

86

Austen Parrish, Domestic Responses to Transnational Crime: The Limits of National
Law, SSRN ELIBRARY (2011), (last visited May 4, 2012).
87
John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009).

2012] A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL THEORY

26

the firm behaved in a manner common to other similarly situated firms.”88
A possibility like this is enticing to prosecutors of international crimes,
who face pervasive corporate offending of long historical pedigree (of
which the arms and extractive industries are exemplars), severe financial
pressures to get as much “justice” as possible for each dollar spent, and
expectations that their work will have transformative effects in ending
culture(s) of impunity that sustain international crimes. In many senses,
then, these arguments are a natural fit within international criminal justice,
perhaps explaining why many view corporate criminal liability as the next
frontier in this trajectory.
But where does this leave civil liability? To begin, those who view
civil liability as valuable but singly inadequate sometimes build models to
explain when one form of liability should prevail over the other, but these
models do too little to control the numerous variables of corporate
criminal offending globally. Samuel Buell, for instance, supports the
continued availability of corporate criminal liability, but argues that it
should feature as the “sharp point” of a pyramid, which includes all range
of civil remedies, including those enforced by public administrative
agencies.89 While I have no doubt that the pyramid has insightful
implications for a certain class of cases, my fear is that extrapolating it
across the variegated types of corporate crimes committed globally (even
by American firms if one wants to limit things thus) assumes a more
mature system of global accountability than we have. All things being
equal, the model makes great sense, but many corporations operate in a
space where opportunities for accountability seldom present in that way.
Another of the best-known divisions between criminal and civil
liability draws the line between corporate actions that society wants to
prohibit outright (which should be criminalized) versus practices it wants
to price (which should attract civil penalties companies can pass on to
consumers).90 Regrettably, this dichotomy too translates poorly into the
new corporate dimensions of international criminal law. Perhaps it
suggests that the complicity of arms vendors in crimes like genocide
should be criminalized because reducing human suffering of this order to
economic terms would be morally outrageous, whereas the illegal
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exploitation of natural resources should figure within civil actions where
legal damages can simply ratchet up the cost of laptops, cars and wedding
rings. And yet, this neat division again presupposes an equality between
criminal and civil opportunities for accountability, which seldom exists
outside the single perfect jurisdiction. Once the theory is subjected to the
international experimentation pragmatists demand, it often leads to no
accountability at all.
Similarly, the political influence of particular industries on
legislatures and law enforcement agencies is not uniform, thereby further
distorting any notional equality between civil and criminal forms of
redress. The point is nowhere more true than in the weapons sector. For
instance, while civil litigation in the United States has had a tremendous
regulatory effect on the tobacco industry, attempts to emulate that effect
within the arms industry have achieved very little—cities such as Chicago,
New York and Philadelphia have almost invariably lost civil suits against
arms manufacturers.91 If a combination of complicity and corporate
criminal liability generates better results, it will most likely be because the
applicable law and procedure interacted more favorably with the
countervailing constellation of power politics in concrete cases; less
because some commercial practices cannot be priced.
What about having corporate criminal liability operate hand in hand
with corporate civil cases? True, corporate criminal liability can also
create incentives for other forms of liability, be they civil liability of the
corporation or criminal responsibility of individuals. In keeping with this
insight, Harry Ball and Lawrence Friedman argue that corporate criminal
liability is useful insofar as it allows prosecutors to threaten “the full
treatment,”92 that is, all heads of accountability for the single crime. The
idea is that corporate criminal liability acts as a threat for cumulative
accountability, unless corporations play along with prosecutors’ desires to
pursue individual representatives of a business, and to a lesser extent,
modulate systems of corporate governance.93 By and large, this is a
welcome proposition, but it still assumes a spectrum of different forms of
accountability, which is frequently unlikely for disaffected communities in
say Africa, who cannot draw on multiple options and will consider one a
luxury. From this different perspective, the “full treatment” seems overly
abstract, when treatment of any sort remains illusive.
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Admittedly, there are real chances that corporate criminal liability
will accentuate the likelihood of civil claims. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar
ably points out as much, when he argues that “some will recognize how
the presence of overlapping criminal and civil jurisdiction can facilitate
the imposition of more severe civil penalties.”94 In particular, Cuéllar
suggests that the acquisition of information from one legal process might
feed into the other, meaning that the two operating in tandem create
results a single form of accountability would not have achieved
independently. At the same time, while one certainly hopes that this type
of cooperation blossoms for cases involving international crimes at the
hands of corporate actors, we should not lose sight of the competing
possibility that one will be used to thwart the other.95 For international
crimes involving corporations, the latter appears more probable.
Take the US Alien Tort Claims Act. Over the past several decades,
the ATCA has emerged as the framework of choice for human rights
advocates, largely on the back of the same types of pragmatic sentiment
that fuelled the growth of corporate criminal liability (decades prior in
Anglo-American systems, but contemporaneously in Europe). Having
read international human rights into the ATCA and somewhat awkwardly
borrowed complicity back into civil liability, human rights advocates
brought civil cases against Yahoo! Inc, Shell, Rio Tinto and a host of
other corporations for enabling human rights abuses in the four corners of
the world. But if there is some synergistic effect between civil and
criminal liability, where are the parallel criminal prosecutions here? There
are, quite simply, none. Again, this suggests that we should be slow to
adopt strong prescriptive positions about the relationship between civil
and criminal liability of corporations, when context yields such
disappointing outcomes.
In sum, our attempts to ascertain the relative merit of civil and
criminal claims against corporations can only be definitive if we exclude
certain classes of cases, thereby undermining our claim to universalism.
To a large extent, pragmatism governs preferences for one system over the
other, which is not to say that no theoretical explanation is relevant. This,
of course, leaves the field open to the retort that the division between civil
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and criminal responsibility of corporations is entirely arbitrary,96 but this
statement too requires qualification. In any event, if we can avoid the
pragmatism that now seems inevitable in seeking justice for corporate
offending globally, more stable theories will not emerge by pretending
that corporations do not operate internationally or that opportunities for
law enforcement are constantly ideal everywhere. To assume these things
risks a collapse into what pragmatists call “philosophical escapism,”
where theory loses touch with the world we live in. In reality, pragmatism
seems destined to play the driving role in delineating criminal from civil
forms of corporate accountability for some time to come.
III. INDIVIDUAL VERSUS CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Even if we suppose that corporate criminal liability will prevail
over philosophical resistance to the ugly process of forcing corporations
into a system built for individuals and that corporate criminal liability
emerges triumphant over civil alternatives, we still face the daunting
intellectual challenge of formulating a defensible philosophical rationale
for distributing blame between corporations and the personnel that operate
them. Here, too, the debate has struggled to conceptualize the full
spectrum of corporate offending to which this philosophy must cater, in
ways that assume a parochial sense of criminal justice, a world without
globalization or a utopian system of global justice that remains some
distance from reality. In this third part, I criticize both sides of the
literature that disputes the significance of corporate criminal liability as
compared with the individual criminal responsibility of corporate officers
as again failing to respond to the core precepts of pragmatism.
A.

Unnecessarily “Local” Preferences for Individual Liability

In a classic criticism of corporate criminal liability, Gerhard Mueller
denounces the instrumental punishment of the corporation for acts that
were undoubtedly carried out by individuals within the company. In
lamenting the pragmatics that gave rise to corporate criminal liability, he
famously compared the concept to a weed: “[n]obody bred it, nobody
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cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.”97 His blanket preference for
individual responsibility focused on a number of factors, but one speaks to
a wider set of problems in this literature. For Mueller, “[i]t is a poor legal
system indeed which is unable to differentiate between the law breaker
and the innocent victim of circumstances so that it must punish both
alike.”98 But this begins a set of arguments that are premised on a very
parochial notion of corporate criminal liability, which crowds out other
understandings of the concept and therefore sheds too little light on
corporate problems that span the globe.
Mueller’s inspiration is exclusively American. In the United States,
corporate criminal liability developed in a highly pragmatic fashion,
drawing heavily on tort law that eschewed traditional notions of criminal
blame. As Kathleen Brickey has noted, “the early doctrine through which
corporations and their managers were held criminally liable developed
with little or no heed to traditional notions of culpability.”99 The notion of
respondeat superior epitomized this methodology; it was simply plucked
out of tort law then deposited in the adjacent criminal field, regardless of
its incongruence with foundational notions of criminal responsibility. So
when Mueller objects to the inability of corporate criminal liability to
differentiate between corporation and individual, he references the fact
that respondeat superior makes the corporation criminally responsibility
for acts of all employees,100 creating an objectionable guilt by proxy that
flies in the face of liberal notions of punishment.
A number of very distinguished scholars emulate this approach,
arguing that individual criminal liability is sufficient, at least in part,
because respondeat superior enables vicarious liability. For example,
Richard Epstein criticizes corporate criminal liability on the basis that
“potency is not enough; specificity and overkill matter as well”.101
Corporate criminal liability may be a very sharp weapon, but it fails to
calibrate punishment with responsibility, and is therefore harsh as a
distributive principle. But in preferring individual criminal responsibility
as a blanket rule (to function in parallel with corporate civil liability),
97
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Epstein and others fail to distinguish corporate criminal liability qua
concept from the vicarious liability model applicable as a matter of extant
doctrine in the United States. This not only overlooks the extensive
literature that argues for alternative theoretical models that better capture
“genuine corporate culpability”102; it is closed to the foreign versions of
corporate criminal liability that stand ready to apply these alternative
standards to live cases, including where American corporate interests are
in question.
This oversight has no real relevance for cases that fall within a
single perfect jurisdiction, but the same cannot be said for transnational
crimes, such as those involving the complicity of arms vendors in
genocide or the corporate pillage of resources from conflict zones. In these
sorts of trans-boundary cases, which involve overlapping criminal
jurisdictions, corporate criminal liability cannot be summarily reduced to a
single monolithic doctrine. For instance, in the context of allegations that
a company named Anvil Mining was complicit in a very serious massacre
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), courts in Australia, Canada,
the DRC and potentially the United States all enjoyed criminal jurisdiction
over the case, leaving the per se preference for individual criminal
responsibility blind to divergent potential consequences generated by very
different understandings of corporate criminal responsibility in each of
these jurisdictions. Is this an example of “transform[ing] purely immediate
qualities of local things into generic relationships”?103
Once again, these different sets of rules must also be seen together
with procedural disparities between jurisdictions. For instance, in the
United States, prosecutors have come to use the threat of corporate
criminal liability as an incentive to ensure that large corporations sacrifice
their guilty corporate officers for individual prosecutions.104 This highly
instrumentalist use of corporate criminal liability allows a very broad
prosecutorial discretion to overcome rules of procedure that inhibit
prosecutions of corporate officers.105 But importantly, these procedural
102
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hurdles do not exist in other jurisdictions.106 As a consequence, theories of
the optimal relationship between individual and corporate responsibility,
which take transnational corporate crimes seriously, also require more
holistic appreciations of surrounding legal norms. Given the complexity
and heterogeneity of legal systems throughout the world, categorical
solutions seem almost impossible to ascertain ahead of time.
Instead of seeking to establish that individual criminal liability is
immutably preferable, it might be better to isolate when corporate criminal
liability is not sufficient, i.e., when is individual criminal responsibility
necessary? At the level of organization theory, this might occur where: (1)
the financial gain to the corporation exceeds that acquired by the manager,
making the manager more vulnerable to measures directed at prohibiting
conduct than the corporation; or (2) where the criminal law is able to
generate a deterrent effect that exceeds that which will befall a manager
through internal retaliation within a company for refusing to violate a
legal norm.107 If a corporate manager is called to purchase blood diamonds
or other conflict commodities by senior management, the less probable
chance of individual criminal responsibility for a war crime may seem
sufficiently unappealing to offset the very likely repercussions from
higher-ups in the corporate structure.
Here too, however, one must be wary of the one-size-fits-all
approach that pervades much of this discourse. In many instances, the
grounds for preferring individual criminal responsibility will be perfectly
banal. For instance, when US prosecutors arrested the famed “Merchant of
Death” Viktor Bout on charges of attempting to sell weapons to the
Colombia rebel group FARC,108 there was little suggestion that his shell
company Cess Air would also be tried, even though the corporate website
unashamedly bragged about much greater sins elsewhere.109 Cess Air had
no assets, little real contact with US jurisdictions, and no good-will
capable of being tarnished. To return to the theorists of corporate criminal
liability, the more controversial focus on criminal responsibility of
106
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corporations is often redundant in closely held companies,110 where the
organization is a mere subterfuge for individual exploits.111 So if
individual criminal responsibility is a necessity in these situations, it is
more because all other options are practically foreclosed, and less because
an individual focus is optimal as a generic policy. Either way, only a
pragmatic theory of corporate criminal responsibility will be supple
enough to mold itself around these variants.
B.

Rationales for Corporate Criminal Liability Are Only Sometimes
True Internationally

How do the arguments that corporate criminal liability is necessary
over and above individual accountability fare in the migration from
domestic theory into international criminal law? In Part I, I discussed a
host of more general consequentialist rationale for corporate criminal
liability, but I saved several that deal with the added value of corporate
criminal liability over individual responsibility for discussion here. These
arguments are myriad, and often expressed in categorical language that
may or may not make sense in specific contexts. As things transpire, many
of these justifications ring true for international crimes at the hands of
corporations within both the extractive and armament sectors, but as the
pragmatists warn, this is not a universalizable truth that can be
automatically transplanted from the local to the international. Once again,
pragmatism is necessary to differentiate aspects of abstract, local,
universalized corporate criminal theory that are relevant from those that
are overly-general when viewed in context.
A classic argument for corporate criminal liability is that the
corporation is better positioned to detect, prevent and remedy crimes
perpetrated by corporate agents than the state. In an excellent series of
articles, Jennifer Arlen points out the superior incentives generated by
holding corporations responsible for policing their own employees, saving
law enforcement agencies the great inefficiency of monitoring from
without.112 International crimes, perpetrated by participants in the
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weapons sector for example, corroborate this position most intensely. If
we hypothesize a case involving the complicity of corporate agents selling
weapons to Angolan warlords, as was the case with the famed Merchant
of Death Viktor Bout, then the company is infinitely better situated to
detect behaviors that satisfy the constitutive elements of the crime than
law enforcement agencies some distance from the scene. In good
pragmatic tradition, Arlen’s theory is vindicated by experimental testing at
the coalface.
After the end of the Cold War, Viktor Bout trafficked guns to the
most brutal conflicts in the world with reckless abandon.113 At one point
during the Angolan war, for instance a UN Panel of Experts cited Bout as
selling weapons to both sides of a brutal conflict that had spanned four
decades, killing at least 500,000 civilians.114 For Bout, this was just the tip
of the iceberg in a notorious career that spanned the most troubled regions
of the globe. When he was finally brought to justice in the United States
for attempting to sell weapons (apparently to be used to shoot down
American civilian planes) to FARC in Colombia,115 proof of the charges
underscored Arlen’s point about placing the corporation, not state, at the
forefront of internal monitoring. Incredibly, the evidence used in the trial
of one of the most talked about arms vendors in the world, alleged to have
sold weapons to those responsible for atrocities in the Congo, Sierra
Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond, stemmed from a single sting
operation carried out by FBI in Thailand.
If the trial based on this one fabricated commercial transaction
grossly understated Bout’s true responsibility, it helped highlight basic
evidentiary problems. Whether perceived or real, the evidential constraints
for law enforcement agencies in cases like this are undoubtedly greater
than for implicated corporations. Stepping back from the specific example
of Bout to consider investigative hurdles prosecutors will face in bringing
charges against corporations for international crimes, the challenges might
seem daunting: access to crime sites for representatives of foreign law
enforcement agencies in, by definition, the most insecure reaches of the
planet; an ability to secure forensic evidence that ties corporations (say
weapons vendors) to international offenses (say massacres); the cost of
bringing witnesses half way across the world to testify in foreign trials,
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difficulties with mutual legal assistance and extradition from Third World
states; and important cultural differences in the way events are
experienced, then communicated.
To some extent, global justice must inevitably grapple with all
these difficulties regardless, but structuring corporate criminal liability in
such a way that companies bear much of this burden seems both efficient
and prudent. Given the scale of the problem, the inadequacy of traditional
responses and the direct access corporations enjoy to information about
their employees, it makes sense to demand that they police transactions by
individual employees that may lead to massacres or involve the illegal
exploitation of conflict commodities. And yet, at the same time, we should
again guard against the tendency to see this explanation as a panacea—
Bout’s company fully supported his nefarious project and was no more
capable of monitoring or restraining the man than Western powers, the
United Nations, human rights advocates or Hollywood.116 So constructing
corporate criminal liability to incentivize internal discipline makes sense
in many, but not all, instances.
What of the problem of fungible corporate employees? When there
is sufficient pressure from within a corporation (or market) to violate legal
proscriptions, individual criminal responsibility offers weak deterrent
value, since corporations will find some employee willing to undertake
their criminal enterprise. As I have argued elsewhere, this problematic
represents the leitmotif for all international crimes—very few atrocities
are so dependent on the acts of any one individual that we can say with
confidence that they would certainly not have transpired absent any one
accused’s individual agency.117 Most atrocities depend on a collective
apparatus, usually a state, military group, political party or criminal
organization, meaning that international criminal justice has some
considerable experience struggling with that thankless task of isolating
individual responsibility from within collective structures. Perhaps it
offers lessons to corporate criminal theory?
Consider the responsibility of individual board members of
companies that enabled apartheid in South Africa. In addressing the
painful history of Western commercial influence on apartheid, the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that ‘[c]ertain
businesses were involved in helping to design and implement apartheid
policies. Other businesses benefited from cooperating with the security
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structures of the former state.’118 Many of these actions constituted
complicity in or direct perpetration of crimes, but allocating responsibility
to individual board members raises complex normative problems—if a
company’s board passed a motion to assist apartheid crimes by a bare
minimum (i.e., 8 votes to 7 in a board composed of 15 members) then
each board member who cast an affirmative vote did make a difference to
the downstream consequences, but in any other voting configuration, the
company would have acted as it did regardless of any individual vote.
In response to these problems, many of the best scholars in
international criminal justice call for collective responsibility. As George
Fletcher has argued, “the liberal bias toward individual criminal
responsibility obscures basic truths about the crimes that now constitute
the core of international criminal law. [They] are deeds that by their very
nature are committed by groups and typically against individuals as
members of groups.”119 To return to the argument in corporate criminal
theory, a turn towards the collective entity may not only allow us to
bypass these cumbersome problems in blaming corporate officers, it may
also generate a degree of deterrence for collective entities that is hard to
bring home to individuals, who know full well that someone else will
perpetrate the crime even if they personally defect. And yet, we are
reminded of the contingencies that will affect the legitimacy of this course
in concrete cases.
This brings us to one of the most often cited justifications for
corporate criminal liability. For very many criminal theorists, corporate
criminal liability can act as a kind of “convenient surrogate” that at least
achieves some accountability when “we cannot identify the real
[individual] decision-maker.”120 This thesis has wide currency politically
too—in calling on all European states to promulgate corporate criminal
118
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law within their criminal codes, the European Union openly pointed to
“the difficulty, due to the often complex management structure in an
enterprise, of identifying the individuals responsible for the commission of
an offence.”121 In simplistic terms, corporate criminal liability is essential
in order to prevent the corporate veil from acting as a protective cloak that
defeats normal forms of criminal accountability.122 Once again, this
important insight is unlikely to be anywhere near a categorical truth.
Trawling through evidence that supports just some of these
international cases, it quickly becomes clear that the present stage of
development is prior to even the earliest phases of corporate criminal
liability domestically. We live in a world where there is perfect impunity
for international crimes perpetrated by corporate actors and their agents,
broken momentarily after WWII and in one or two sporadic instances in
the past decade. Understandably, businesses and their employees have
become utterly complacent. To cite one example, the chairman of one
important multinational described company conduct in a warring African
state in the 1980s in terms that may well amount to a more or less
verbatim confession to the war crime of pillage—and this in the
company’s annual report. If evidence against prominent corporate
individuals is hard to come by in many domestic contexts, the same is not
self-evident internationally.
This insight again underscores why we should hesitate to take even
the most erudite theoretical explanations for corporate criminal liability as
gospel truth for every manifestation of the phenomenon they describe,
since some received wisdoms are incompatible with the realities of
specific corporate crimes. Instead, the task may be to develop a much
more sophisticated set of factors that are relevant in seeking justice for
corporate wrongdoing, and to identify many of the variables we have
taken for granted until now. At the level of responsibility, however, there
may be ground for viewing the company and its employees as coperpetrators of international crimes. If one regards the corporation as a
repository of a particular ethos that can support the allocation of criminal
blame, the argument that this corporate ethos is frequently complicit in the
individual officer’s crime is compelling.123 As always, however, the
pragmatists’ reminder that so much depends on context is a helpful check
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on our desire for all-encompassing theories, which always miss the mark
somewhere in the real world.

IV. CONCLUSION: A PROBLEM MORE COMPLEX
This article has presented a criticism of the literature addressing the
identity of corporate criminal liability, offering reflections from the far
peripheries of the subject. To be clear, much of the theory of corporate
criminal liability is highly illuminating in plotting factors for
consideration, even if it frequently arrives at conclusions that do not
square with all variations of the phenomena they describe. This arises
because much of the literature has adopted parochial concepts of corporate
criminal law, categorical positions that are not sensitive to the
complexities of reality, and philosophical positions that downplay the
intensity of transnational commercial ventures as part of an increasingly
globalized marketplace. If cases from international criminal justice help
expose this reality, they may have some role in generating new holistic
theories that better account for the problem of corporate misconduct in its
full sense. These theories must move from absolute overstatement to
reveal more of the hidden variables, understand the applicable laws as best
possible, and develop conceptual factors that favor one path over the next
on a provisional not fixed basis. Until we inhabit a more orderly global
society where opportunities for corporate accountability are drastically
improved, a pragmatic theory of this sort is inescapable.

